Bradley J. Olsen, an individual; American Pensions Services, Inc. Administrator for Roth IRA# 6765, a Utah corporation; American Pension Service, Inc., Administrator for Roth IRA # 7453, a Utah corporation v. Doug Chase, an individual; Chantel S. Chase, an individual; Bank of the West, a California corporation : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2009
Bradley J. Olsen, an individual; American Pensions
Services, Inc. Administrator for Roth IRA# 6765, a
Utah corporation; American Pension Service, Inc.,
Administrator for Roth IRA # 7453, a Utah
corporation v. Doug Chase, an individual; Chantel
S. Chase, an individual; Bank of the West, a
California corporation : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Ronald G. Russell; Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless; Attorneys for Appellee.
Zachary E. Peterson; Paul P. Burghardt; Richards Brandt Miller Nelson; Attorneys for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Olsen v. Chase, No. 20090903 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2009).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/1971
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BRADLEY J. OLSEN, an individual; 
AMERICAN PENSION SERVICES, 
INC. ADMINISTRATOR FOR ROTH 
IRA# 6765, a Utah corporation; 
AMERICAN PENSION SERVICE, INC., 
ADMINISTRATOR FOR ROTH IRA # 
7453, a Utah corporation, 
Appellant/Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DOUG CHASE, an individual; 
CHANTEL S. CHASE, an individual; 
BANK OF THE WEST, a California 
corporation, 
Appellee/Defendants. 
Case No. 20090903-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a Final Order of the Second District Court, Davis County, State of 
Utah, Judge David M. Connors 
RONALD G. RUSSELL 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN 
GEE & LOVELESS 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
E-mail: rg@pwlaw.com 
Telephone: (801)532-7840 
Fax No.: (801)532-7750 
Attorneys for Appellee 
ZACHARY E. PETERSON [8502] 
PAUL P. BURGHARDT [10795] 
RICHARDS BRANDT MILLER NELSON 
th 
Wells Fargo Center, 15 Floor 
299 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 




Fax No.: (801)532-5506 
Attorneys for Appellant 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BRADLEY J. OLSEN, an individual; 
AMERICAN PENSION SERVICES, 
INC. ADMINISTRATOR FOR ROTH 
IRA# 6765, a Utah corporation; 
AMERICAN PENSION SERVICE, INC., 
ADMINISTRATOR FOR ROTH IRA # 
7453, a Utah corporation, 
Appellant/Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DOUG CHASE, an individual; 
CHANTEL S. CHASE, an individual; 
BANK OF THE WEST, a California 
corporation, 
Appellee/Defendants. 
Case No. 20090903-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a Final Order of the Second District Court, Davis County, State of 
Utah, Judge David M. Connors 
RONALD G. RUSSELL 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN 
GEE & LOVELESS 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
E-mail: rg@pwlaw.com 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
Fax No.: (801)532-7750 
Attorneys for Appellee 
ZACHARY E. PETERSON [8502] 
PAUL P. BURGHARDT [10795] 
RICHARDS BRANDT MILLER NELSON 
Wells Fargo Center, 15th Floor 
299 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 




Fax No.: (801)532-5506 
Attorneys for Appellant 
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
The caption identifies all of the parties to the appeal. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
LIST OF PARTIES ii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS iii-iv 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES v 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 1 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 1-2 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2-3 
NATURE OF THE CASE 2-3 
FACTS 3-4 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION 
IN THE LOWER COURT 4-6 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 6-7 
ARGUMENT ..7-19 
I. The provisions and policy requirements of Utah's mechanics' lien statute 
preclude a claimant from waiving or altering its lien rights by 
private contract 7-10 
II. The trial court failed to follow the plain language of the statute and stated 
policy goals underlying the provisions of the statute 11-15 
III. The trial court misapplied Utah law and failed to acknowledge the issues 
of fact regarding the Guaranty of Completion 16-19 
CONCLUSION 19 
ADDENDUM 21 
Order and Final Judgment 
Ruling Granting Cross Motion for summary Judgment 
Hi 
Guaranty of Completion and Performance 
Utah Code Ann. §38-1-39 
iv 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Bentz Plumbing & Heating v. Favaloro, 
180 Cal.Rptr. 223, 225-226 (Cal. App. 3rd Dist. 1982) 9, 10 
Berkeley Bank for Cooperatives v. Meibos, 
607 P.2d 798, 804 (Utah 1980) 16, 17, 18 
Brown and Kerr v. American Stores Prop., 
715 N.E.2d 804, 812 (111. Ct. App. 1999) 8 
Clifton Steel Corp. v. GE, 
80 A.D.2d 714, 715 (N.Y. App. Ct. 1981) 8 
Geisdorfv. Doughty, 
972 P.2d 67, 73 (Utah 1998) 16 
Halbert's Lumber, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 
8 Cal.Rptr.2d 298, 307 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th 1992) 10 
National Glass v. J.C. Penny Prop., Inc., 
650 A.2d 246, 250 (Md. Ct. App. 1994) 8 
Richards v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, 
849 P.2d 606 (Utah 1993) 14, 15 
Sill v. Hart, 
2007 UT 45, f 8, 162 P.3d 1099 7, 8 
The Cantamar, L.L.C v. Champagne, 
2006 UT App 321,1fi)20-24, 142 P.3d 140 16 
Tri-State Mechanical, Inc. v. Northland College, 
681 N.W.2d 302, 304 (Wis. Ct. App 2004) 8 
Rules 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-29 1, 2, 10, 11, 12 
Utah Code Ann. §38-1-39 2,9, 10, 11, 13 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103 2 
v 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Issue I: The Utah Mechanics' Lien prohibits a lien claimant from waiving or altering 
its lien rights by private agreement. The parties entered into an agreement which 
required the lien claimant to subordinate its right, including its statutory right of priority, 
to the construction lender. Did the trial court err when it concluded this private 
agreement did not violate the plain language of the statute? 
Standard of Review: The trial court's statutory interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 38-
1-29 is reviewed for correctness. See S.C v. Anderson, 1999 UT App 251, f8, 987 P.2d 
611. 
Issue Preserved: This issue was preserved in the Record at pp. 45-113, 133-160, 274-
283,343. 
Issue II: The only evidence in the record indicated that the party with superior 
knowledge of the terms and effect of a document and in superior bargaining position 
misrepresented the effect of a document in order to induce the lien claimant's signature 
on the document. Did the trial court err when it resolved all factual inferences against the 
non-moving party, ignored genuine issues of disputed fact, and improperly applied Utah 
law in order to grant the lender's motion for summary judgment? 
Standard of Review: On appeal from a summary judgment motion, the appellate court 
reviews the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See 
Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 1993). Whether a party is entitled 
to summary judgment presents a question of law and the appellate court grants no 
deference to the trial court's legal conclusions and reviews them for correctness. See 
1 
Higgins, 855 P.2d at 235; Stangl v. Ernst Home Center, 948 P.2d 356: 360 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997). 
Issue Preserved: This issue was preserved in the Record at pp. 133-160, 274-283, 
343. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
103(2)0). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-29 
The applicability of the provisions of this chapter, including the waiver of 
rights or privileges granted under this chapter, may not be varied by 
agreement. 
Utah Code Ann. 38-1-39 is attached in full in the addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This appeal arises from a grant of summary judgment to defendants in plaintiffs 
action to enforce a mechanics' lien. The issues in this case primarily turn on statutory 
interpretation. Along with the statutory interpretation, this case involves the competing 
policies of protecting contractors who supply labor and materials in construction projects 
versus allowing lenders who finance construction projects to have some protections 
against unknown lien claims. In the end, the facts of this case, the application of Utah 
law to these facts, and consideration of the applicable policy concerns all support the 
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conclusion that the trial court erred in granting defendants' motion for summary 
judgment. 
Facts 
Maestro Builders agreed to build a home for Matt Hood in 2006. (R. at 49). 
According to the testimony of Maestro's principal, Luke Watkins, Maestro started 
construction in late October, 2006. (R. at 49, 134). An inspector for Layton City 
inspected the foundation footings and issued an inspection report on November 1, 2006. 
(R.at 49). Hood entered into a construction loan agreement with First Utah Bank, which 
was secured by a deed of trust recorded on the home on November 9, 2006. (R. at 49). 
As part of the construction loan, First Utah Bank asked Maestro to sign a "Guaranty of 
Completion of Performance." (R. at 138). An agent of First Utah represented to Mr. 
Watkins that the Guaranty of Completion required Maestro to complete construction of 
the home if Matt Hood died or otherwise did not complete construction. (R. at 138). 
As it turns out, the Guaranty of Completion also required Maestro to subordinate 
and release any mechanics5 lien rights it had under Utah law. (R. at 159-60). Although 
Maestro received payment on some of its draw requests from the construction loan, 
Maestro was not paid in full for its work on the Hood home. (R. at 49-50). Accordingly, 
Maestro filed a mechanics' lien on the home in order to recover the additional amounts 
owed. (R. at 50). 
Ultimately, First Utah foreclosed on the home and sold it to Skyline Real Estate at 
a non-judicial foreclosure. (R. at 50). Skyline later sold the home to Doug and Chantel 
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Chase. (R. at 50). Maestro's lien was recorded against the home prior to the foreclosure 
sale and the Chase's subsequent purchase. 
Maestro assigned its mechanics' lien to Bradley Olsen, the plaintiff in this action. 
(R. at 50). Olsen filed this action to foreclose on the mechanics' lien. (R. at 1). 
Defendants answered the complaint and never identified or raised the Guaranty of 
Completion as a defense to the action. (R. at 36-42). After filing the suit, Olsen filed a 
motion for summary judgment in which he requested a ruling that Maestro's lien had 
priority over the First Utah trust deed. (R. at 45-113). After conducting some discovery 
during which the Guaranty of Completion was first disclosed, defendants opposed this 
motion and argued the Guaranty of Completion required Maestro to subordinate any 
rights or interests in favor of First Utah. (R. at 188-266). Defendants filed a cross motion 
for summary judgment and requested the Court to find the foreclosure extinguished 
Maestro's lien. (R. at 129-132). In response, Olsen argued the mechanics' lien statute in 
effect at the time the lien was filed precluded a contractor from entering into a private 
agreement that waived or altered its statutory lien rights, and in the alternative, that First 
Utah had misrepresented the purpose and effect of the Guaranty of Completion in order 
to induce Maestro to sign the agreement. (R. at 133-160). 
Procedural Details of Case and Disposition of the Case Below 
This appeal arises from the parties' cross motions for summary judgment. Shortly 
after filing the complaint, Olsen moved for summary judgment on the issue of the priority 
of the mechanics' lien. (R. at 45-46). Olsen argued that the mechanics' lien related back 
to the first work performed on the house, and therefore, the lien had priority over the 
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lender's trust deed. (R. at 48-53). Specifically, Olsen identified undisputed issues of fact 
to demonstrate visible work commenced on the property not later than November 1, 
2009. (R. at 49-50). Since the lender's trust deed was not recorded until November 9, 
2009, Olsen argued the applicable mechanics' lien statute gave the mechanics' lien 
priority over the lender's trust deed. (R. at 52-53). 
After Olsen filed his motion for partial summary judgment, the parties agreed that 
defendants would be allowed to take the deposition of Maestro Builders' principal, Luke 
Watkins. (R. at 114-121). The evening before Watkins' deposition, defendants provided 
Olsen's counsel with additional documents that it intended to use in Watkins' deposition. 
These documents contained the Guaranty of Completion that Watkins had signed. This 
was the first time Olsen learned of the Guaranty of Completion. Indeed, defendants' 
Answer did not identify or assert the Guaranty of Completion, or any other document, as 
an affirmative defense to Olsen's lien claim. (R. at 36-42). 
After Watkins' deposition, defendants opposed Olsen's motion and filed a cross 
motion for summary judgment to have Olsen's lien claim dismissed based on the 
Guaranty of Completion. (R. at 129-132, 188-266). Defendants argued the Guaranty of 
Completion required the lien claimant to subordinate its lien in favor of the lender's trust 
deed. (R. at 189-90) Olsen opposed defendants' cross motion by citing to Watkins' 
testimony about the execution of the document and why he signed it. (R. at 133-145). 
Specifically, Watkins testified that he did not read the Guaranty of Completion because 
the lender misrepresented the effect of the document and suggested that he did not need 
to read it. (R. at 138-39). In fact, Watkins testified the lender represented the effect of the 
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document was consistent with the document's title: a Guaranty of Completion and 
Performance. (R. at 138-39). Based on this testimony, Olsen argued the Guaranty of 
Completion was unenforceable and that issues of fact precluded a grant of summary 
judgment in favor of defendants. (R. at 143-45). In addition, Olsen argued the 
mechanics' lien statute precluded a claimant from waiving or abrogating its lien rights 
granted by the Utah Legislature through a private agreement. (R. at 139-42). 
The trial court denied Olsen's motion and granted defendants' cross motion. (R. at 
294-301). The trial court ruled that Maestro had not actually waived any of its statutory 
rights. (R. at 298-99). According to the trial court, the Guaranty of Completion did not 
violate the statute because it did not require Maestro to waive any of its statutory rights— 
it found the Guaranty of Completion merely subordinated those rights in favor of First 
Utah. (R. at 298-99). In part, the trial court based its ruling on its own familiarity with 
the industry and what it considered to be standard and necessary practices of lenders. (R. 
at 298-99, 343: 3-4). In addition, the trial court ruled that Maestro's failure to read and 
comprehend the Guaranty of Completion excused any misrepresentation on the part of 
First Utah with respect to inducing Maestro to sign it (R. at 299). The trial court later 
awarded defendants' costs and attorney fees under the mechanics' lien statute. (R. at 
314-320). This appeal ensued. (R. at 329). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court erred when it ignored the plain language of the mechanics' lien 
statute that precludes a claimant from waiving or altering its lien rights under the statute. 
The statute unambiguously precludes a lien claimant from altering or waiving any lien 
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rights, and the trial court erred when it concluded a subordination of priority is permitted 
under the statute. Furthermore, the trial court substituted its own view of how the 
construction industry and lenders should operate in contrast to stated policy of the 
Legislature. 
The trial court's err was compounded when it rejected Watkins' deposition 
testimony regarding the lender's representations concerning the effect of the Guaranty of 
Completion. The bank offered no evidence to refute Watkins' testimony. Instead, the 
bank argued that Watkins' failure to read the document excused any misrepresentation. 
Utah law provides that a signature induced by fraud or artifice is not binding, and the 
agreement is rendered unenforceable. The trial court ignored this law, and it found 
Watkins' testimony was not "reasonable" in light of the circumstances. The question of 
reasonable reliance is a jury question that is not susceptible to resolution on a motion for 
summary judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The provisions and policy requirements of Utah's mechanics' lien statute 
preclude a claimant from waiving or altering its lien rights by private 
contract. 
The Utah Mechanics' Lien statute contains several provisions and safeguards to 
ensure contractors and suppliers are paid for their work and materials. The Utah 
Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he purpose and intent of Utah's Mechanic's Lien Act 
manifestly has been to protect, at all hazards, those who perform the labor and furnish the 
materials which enter into the construction of a building or other improvement. Lien 
statutes should be broadly construed to effectuate that purpose." Sill v. Hart, 2007 UT 
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45, f8, 162 P.3d 1099 (quoting Interiors Contracting v. Navalco, 648 P.2d 1382, 1386 
(Utah 1982) (emphasis added)). 
In 2006 and in furtherance of the stated purpose of the mechanics' lien statute, the 
statute contained an express provision that prevented contractors from waiving or altering 
any of their statutory rights to file and enforce mechanics' liens through a private 
agreement. See Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-29 (2006). Specifically, section 38-1-29 is titled 
"No waiver of lien rights," and provides: "The applicability of the provisions of this 
chapter, including the waiver of rights or privileges granted under this chapter, may not 
be varied by agreement." Id. 
Utah's mechanics' lien statute tracks the model mechanics' lien statute. Indeed, 
similar statutes prohibiting lien waivers exist in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., National 
Glass v. J. C Penny Prop., Inc., 650 A.2d 246, 250 (Md. Ct. App. 1994) (Maryland 
Mechanic's lien "statute provides clear legislative indication that any provision 
attempting to waive the right to a mechanic's lien is void as against the public policy"); 
Clifton Steel Corp. v. GE9 80 A.D.2d 714, 715 (N.Y. App. Ct. 1981) ("New York law 
specifically prohibits any waiver of the right to file or enforce such liens as against public 
policy."); Tri-State Mechanical, Inc. v. Northland College, 681 N.W.2d 302, 304 (Wis. 
Ct. App 2004) (holding that Wisconsin mechanic's lien waiver was void under statute 
and that general purpose of lien law was to protect contractors); Brown and Kerr v. 
American Stores Prop., 715 N.E.2d 804, 812 (111. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that Illinois 
mechanic's lien statute "prohibits agreements to waive any right to enforce or claim a 
lien"). These statutory prohibitions against waiving or abrogating lien rights were put in 
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place to protect lien claimants from the frequent unequal bargaining positions with 
respect to lenders. See, e.g., Bentz Plumbing & Heating v. Favaloro, 180 Cal.Rptr. 223, 
225-226 (Cal. App. 3rd Dist. 1982) (discussing purpose behind lien statute and lien waiver 
provisions).1 
In 2007, the Utah Legislature amended the general prohibition on the waiver of 
lien rights found in section 38-1-29 for agreements executed after January 1, 2007. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-39 (2007). Section 38-1-39 provides: Notwithstanding Section 
38-1-29, a written consent by a lien claimant that waives or limits the lien claimant's lien 
rights is enforceable only i f the waiver complies with the requirements set forth in the 
statute. Id. (emphasis added). Thus, private agreements which purport to waive or limit 
lien rights executed after January 1, 2007 are enforceable, but only if the waiver strictly 
complies with the statutory requirements set forth in 38-1-39. The important 
requirements for a valid waiver or abrogation of lien rights are: (1) a signed release from 
the lien claimant, and (2) payment of the amount identified in the release. See id. 
Section 38-1-39 goes on to set forth model consent forms. See id. 
Utah was not alone or even the first state to enact a statute that allowed a lien 
claimant to waive or abrogate lien rights. Again, California provides guidance for the 
policy reasons for allowing a claimant to contract away its lien rights. Discussing the 
problems with a blanket prohibition on waiver or abrogation of lien rights, the California 
1
 The statute discussed in Bentz was later repealed. Thus, the specific holding of Bentz is 
no longer good law in California; however, the policy discussion in Bentz is still accurate 
and applicable to the issue in this case. 
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Court of Appeals stated: "the ability of construction lenders to obtain valid releases of 
liens was undercut by Bentz Plumbing & Heating v. Favaloro.... Bentz construed 
[California's lien waiver prohibition] to render all lien waivers null and void... . The 
decision dried up construction loans and plunged construction lending in California into 
chaos." Halbert's Lumber, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 298, 307 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 4th 1992) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Like California, Utah adopted 
section 38-1-39 to provide lenders with the ability to obtain lien waivers in certain 
circumstances and to prevent the problems experienced in California after the Bentz 
decision. 
Accordingly, prior to the enactment of section 38-1-39, a lien claimant in Utah 
could not waive or abrogate lien rights by private agreement under section 38-1-29. 
After its enactment in 2007, a lien claimant could waive or abrogate lien rights if the 
consent form strictly complied with the requirements of section 38-1-39. In order for an 
agreement to be enforceable, however, the claimant had to sign the waiver and receive 
the payment set forth in the document. In other words, the lien claimant could waive or 
abrogate its rights under the lien statute only if the claimant executed a valid waiver and 
only if the claimant was paid as set forth in the waiver. A lien waiver not accompanied 
by the identified payment would not be enforceable under section 38-1-39. Accordingly, 
section 38-1-39 provides some protection for construction lenders, but it does so in 
furtherance of the overall goal of the mechanics' lien statute, which is to protect lien 
claimants and assure payment for labor and services provided. 
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II. The trial court failed to follow the plain language of the statute and stated 
policy goals underlying the provisions of the statute. 
Notwithstanding the above statutory provisions and the policy underlying the 
statute, the trial court determined that a document signed on October 30, 2006 did not 
violate the provisions of the 2006 mechanics' lien statute, even though it required the 
contractor to waive its statutory right of priority and effectively eliminated the 
contractor's ability to enforce its lien right. The trial court avoided the unambiguous 
language contained in section 38-1-29 by concluding that a subordination of a statutory 
right of priority is not a waiver of rights or privileges granted under the Utah mechanic's 
lien statute. Specifically, the trial court stated: "The Completion Guaranty does not, 
however, indicate that the provisions of Utah's mechanic's lien statute would not be 
'applicable', nor does it indicate Maestro would be 'waiving' any rights under that 
statute. In pertinent part, it simply provides that whatever rights Maestro might have 
(under the mechanic's lien statute or otherwise) would be subordinate to the bank's rights 
under its construction loan." (R. at 298). 
In making its ruling, the trial court improperly focused on two factors: (1) 
whether a subordination agreement is a waiver, and (2) whether the use of subordination 
agreements is an accepted and sanctioned business practice. In so doing, however, the 
trial court failed to analyze the plain language of the statute, and it failed to follow the 
policy underlying the statute. 
First, the trial court improperly focused on whether a subordination agreement is 
a waiver which is precluded by the statute. The statutory language, however, covers 
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more than just waivers. If the descriptive clause "including" is removed from section 38-
1-29, the statute simply reads: "The applicability of the provisions of this chapter . . . 
may not be varied by agreement." Id. The "including" clause merely describes a smaller 
group comprised of waivers that are included in the broader definition in the statute, i.e. 
"including the waiver of rights or privileges granted under this chapter." Id. 
Accordingly, the trial court improperly focused on whether a subordination agreement 
was a waiver. The plain language of the statutes prohibits a lien claimant from varying 
any of the provisions of the statute, regardless of the form of the agreement— whether a 
waiver, subordination, or guaranty. The trial court erred in its conclusion that a 
subordination is not a waiver under the statute. 
The statute states that "applicability of the provisions . . . may not be varied by 
agreement." Section 38-1-5 specifically grants a lien claimant the right to claim priority 
from the date the first work began. This is an exception to the general recording rule, and 
it represents an extremely important right and privilege granted by the Utah mechanics' 
lien statute. By definition, if one subordinates its right to priority as dictated by the 
statute, one has "varied" or "waived" the applicability of the priority provisions of the 
statute. A private agreement or contract which subordinates a claimant's right of priority 
substantially alters the rights specifically granted by the Utah legislature. In this case, 
subordination of the lien claim effectively precludes the lien claim from recovering 
because of the lender's contractual priority and subsequent tight to foreclosure any junior 
claimants. 
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Second, as to accepted practices in the industry, the trial court also erred. The 
trial court in its ruling relied in part on its belief that subordination agreements were 
necessary in the construction and lending industry to provide lenders some measure of 
protection against mechanics' liens. (R. at 299, 343: 3-4) Without such agreements, 
lenders would be reticent about providing construction agreements. Accordingly, the 
trial court relied on its familiarity with the industry standards when it made its ruling to 
uphold the Guaranty of Completion despite the statutory language. 
In so doing, however, the trial court ignored the requirements put in place by the 
Utah Legislature when it enacted section 38-1-39. Although section 38-1-39 did not 
apply to the Guaranty of Completion in this matter, that section is instructive as to the 
requirements for a enforceable lien waiver. Under section 38-1-39, a lien waiver must at 
the very least be accompanied by a payment to claimant and notice of the terms of the 
release/waiver of the lien rights. Neither of these requirements are present in this case. 
The Guaranty of Completion does not provide for any guaranty of payment to Maestro 
and does not set forth the amount being released by the Guaranty. Absent this critical 
material term, the Guaranty is unenforceable even under the limited waiver provisions of 
38-1-39. 
Furthermore, the Guaranty of Completion requires the guarantor to compromise 
its right to payment from the borrower. In other words, not only does the Guaranty of 
Completion not provide for payment to the guarantor, but it actually compromises the 
guarantor's ability to be paid or to collect in the event of non-payment. Thus, the 
Guaranty of Completion is clear contract of adhesion. It is a requirement for the 
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construction loan on which the guarantor is relying on for payment; however, it is a one-
sided document which then takes away the guarantor's right to payment and ability to 
collect. 
The mechanics' lien statutes contained lien waiver prohibitions for precisely this 
reason. Banks and lenders were requiring contractors to waive, subordinate, and abrogate 
their lien rights as a prerequisite to a lender financing the project. Thus, the contractor 
was in a catch-22. Should the contractor refuse to sign the guaranty and waiver, the 
lender would refuse to finance the project, and the contractor would be out of work. Or, 
the contractor could sign the guaranty and waiver, however, the contractor would be 
compromising its right to payment and ability to collect unpaid sums. The mechanics' 
lien statutes initially addressed this problem by prohibiting any waiver or abrogation of 
lien rights by private agreement. Later, the legislature amended the statutes to allow 
waivers in limited circumstances, but only after the claimant had been paid for its work or 
materials on the project. 
Before the trial court, the bank relied on Richards v. Security Pac. Nat 7 Bank, 
849 P.2d 606 (Utah 1993) for the proposition that Utah has sanctioned the use of 
subordination agreements in these circumstances. The Richards opinion merely states in 
dicta that a lender may use a subordination agreement. See id at 612. The opinion, 
however, was issued before the legislature enacted either section 38-1-29 or 38-1-39. 
Accordingly, to the extent it had any relevance to the issue in this matter, its holding has 
been superseded by statute. Further, the opinion for the most part would support Olsen 
over the bank. 
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In Richards, the Utah Court of Appeals stated: "Given the legislature's creation 
of a specific statutory preference for mechanic's lienholders, if the question is framed as 
a choice between which party should receive a windfall, we believe it should be the 
mechanic's lienholder." Id. Indeed, the same factual considerations that supported the 
Court's statement in Richards are present in this case. Specifically, the bank has received 
the value of Maestro's work "without having paid anything for it." Id. Additionally, the 
bank could have easily examined the property before making the loan. Had the bank 
taken this simple step, the bank would have discovered both that Maestro had 
commenced visible work and that the city had inspected the work and issued a footings 
and foundation report. All of these events occurred prior to the bank recording its trust 
deed. Furthermore, the lien was recorded and known to all at the time the bank 
commenced foreclosure and when the home was later sold to the Chases. Accordingly, 
the Richards opinion does not support the bank in this case: "Given the statutory 
protection granted mechanic's lienholders, it is much more appropriate to have 
commercial lenders bear the burden of protecting themselves." Id. 
In making its ruling, the trial court wholly failed to adhere to the plain language 
of the statute in effect at the time the Guaranty of Completion was signed, and it wholly 
failed to follow the principles underlying the mechanics' lien statute. The statute is to be 
liberally construed in favor of lien claimants in order to protect their right to be paid. The 
trial court did not address or follow the overriding policy concern of protecting lien 
claimants. In failing to do so, the trial court's ruling was error. 
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III. The trial court misapplied Utah law and failed to acknowledge the issues of 
fact regarding the Guaranty of Completion. 
The trial court erred when it concluded that Maestro's failure to read the 
Guaranty of Completion trumped any issues of fact regarding the lender's 
misrepresentation and fraudulent inducement regarding its execution. Utah has long 
recognized the rule of law which provides '"that a person will be given relief from fraud 
even though he failed to read the contract before signing if he was by some act or artifice 
induced to refrain from reading it, or if because of the circumstances he was justified in 
relying on the representations made.'" Berkeley Bank for Cooperatives v. Meibos, 607 
P.2d 798, 804 (Utah 1980) {quoting Johnson v. Allen, 108 Utah 148, 158 P.2d 134, 137 
(1945)); see also The Cantamar, L.L.C v. Champagne, 2006 UT App 321, ft20-24, 142 
P.3d 140. The trial court erred in preventing plaintiffs from asserting a fraudulent 
inducement defense to the jury when disputed issues of fact existed regarding the 
circumstances surrounding Maestro's signature on the Guaranty of Completion. 
In making its ruling, the trial court relied on Utah law which provides that "'one 
party to an agreement does not have a duty to ensure that the other party has a complete 
and accurate understanding of all terms embodied in a written contract.'" (R. at 299 
{quoting Geisdorfv. Doughty, 972 P.2d 67, 73 (Utah 1998)). The trial court buttressed its 
conclusion by stating that plaintiffs had provided no evidence that Maestro was "coerced, 
or otherwise forced" into signing the Guaranty. Moreover, the trial court concluded that 
there was no evidence Maestro's reliance on any alleged misrepresentations was 
reasonable. (R. at 299). In summary, the trial court stated: "Accordingly, this Court is in 
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a position to summarily dismiss Plaintiffs claim that it was fraudulently induced to sign 
the Completion Guaranty. Maestro's failure to read the Completion Guaranty, under 
Utah law, is no defense." (R. at 299). 
The trial court erred as to the applicable law and it erred as to whether genuine 
issues of fact existed. Olsen submitted un-contradicted testimony to the trial court that 
indicated the bank official opened the Guaranty to the last page and requested Luke 
Watkins sign the form without reading it. (R. at 138). Further, the bank official 
represented the document was fairly perfunctory in nature and simply required Maestro to 
finish the project if the borrower died or was not around. (R. at 138). Accordingly, 
neither Watkins, nor anyone else at Maestro Builders, read the Guaranty of Completion. 
The failure to read the document was because the bank induced Maestro to not read the 
document by misrepresenting what the document meant. 
In addition, the representations made by the bank in order to induce Maestro's 
signature are consistent with the title of the document. The document is conspicuously 
titled: "Guaranty of Completion and Performance." Nowhere in the title nor anywhere on 
the first page of the document is the guarantor advised that the document is subordinating 
the guarantor's right to payment and altering lien rights. If the document was titled 
"Waiver of Lien Rights," the bank might have a stronger argument; however, the issue 
would focus on the reasonableness of Maestro's reliance on the bank's misrepresentation 
when handed a document with a contradictory title. The issue of reasonable reliance is 
still a jury question and not an issue the trial court can rule on as a matter of law. See 
Berkeley Bank, 607 P.2d at 801 (issue of reasonable reliance is for jury). 
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The trial court relied on Maestro's failure to read the documents as the basis for 
rejecting the defense. The trial court failed to adequately address the well established 
policy adopted by the Utah Supreme Court: "It can hardly be maintained that the general 
moral level of business and other financial relationships would be enhanced by a rule of 
law which would allow a person to defend against a willful, deliberate fraud by stating, 
' You should not have trusted or believed me' or 'Had you not been so gullible you would 
not have been (so) deceived.'" Berkeley Bank, 607 P.2d at 805. Yet, this is precisely 
what the bank argued and the trial court allowed. In addition, the trial court made all 
inferences of the facts in the bank's favor. 
The Guaranty of Completion is a three page document which contains a series of 
boilerplate requirements. Its title, Guaranty of Completion, is consistent with the lender's 
representation that it merely required Maestro to compete the project, and does not 
suggest that it is a waiver of any rights. The Guaranty of Completion is entirely one-
sided in favor of the bank, and it is inconsistent with the actual construction project. For 
example, as the bank knew prior to entering into the construction loan, this project was a 
cost plus project. Maestro could not represent and warrant the actual final costs of the 
project—unlike a fixed cost project where the owner and builder agree in advance to a 
specific cost. Nonetheless, this was one of the many "guarantees" required by the 
document. 
Moreover, Watkins was in no position to request different terms for the 
construction loan or to the documents he had to sign. Maestro and Watkins had agreed to 
build a house for Hood, and the construction loan was necessary to finance the project. 
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Hood had already told Maestro that he had obtained financing for the project, and 
Maestro had started its work. The bank was not going to edit the document to suit 
Maestro or Watkins. In other words, Maestro and Watkins were in no position to demand 
changes from the bank. The bank officer simply presented a series of signature pages to 
Watkins for his signature, and he represented to Watkins what these documents meant. 
The only factual allegation in the record indicated that Watkins had not read the 
Guaranty of Completion when he signed it. Watkins' uncontradicted testimony was that 
he did not read the Guaranty of Completion because the bank officer represented the 
effect of the document to him and simply handed him the signature page to sign. The 
bank offered no evidence to contradict Watkins' testimony. The trial court ignored this 
fact, concluded Watkins' reliance on the misrepresentation was not reasonable, and relied 
on Watkins' statement that he did not read the document to find that he could not raise a 
defense to the document. The trial court erred when it ignored disputed issues of fact and 
resolved inferences in favor of the bank, and it compounded its error by failing to follow 
established Utah law. The issue whether the Guaranty of Completion was validly entered 
into and an enforceable document was for the jury to decide. 
CONCLUSION 
In granting the bank's motion for summary judgment, the trial court committed 
reversible error in two respects. First, the trial court ignored the plain language of the 
statute which precludes the parties from contracting away any lien rights. The trial court 
avoided this statutory prohibition by finding a subordination of a statutory right of 
priority is not a waiver or alteration of lien rights. 
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When presented with un-refuted testimony to demonstrate the lien claimant's 
signature on the document was induced by the lender's misrepresentation of the 
document's effect, the trial court ignored Utah law which renders agreements induced by 
fraud or artifice unenforceable. Moreover, the trial court resolved disputed issues of fact 
and made factual inferences in favor of the moving party in order to grant the motion. 
The trial court's ruling is not supported by Utah law and should be reversed. 
DATED this / Q day of February, 2010. 
WgHAtfpS BRANDT MILLER NELSON 
Y^TFETERSON 
/ PAUL\P. BURGHARDT 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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Services, Administrator for Roth IRA # 7453. Ronald G, Russell and Royce B. Covington 
appeared on behalf of Defendants Doug Chase, Chantel Chase and Bank of the West. At the 
conclusion of oral argument, the Court allowed the parties to submit supplemental briefing. On 
July 20, 2009, after a review of the file in this case, including all supplemental memoranda, 
and after consideration of the oral argument made before the Court, the Court issued its Ruling 
Granting Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, and for the reasons stated therein, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows; 
1, Defendants* Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED and Plaintiffs* 
Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. 
2. Plaintiffs* claims are hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
3, The Lis Pendens recorded by Plaintiffs on September 3, 2008 with the Davis County 
Recorder at Entry Number 2390115, Book 4607, Page 771-772, is released. 
4. Plaintiffs* Notice of Mechanic's Lien recorded on March 31, 2008 with the Davis 
County Recorder at Entry Number 2353276, Book 4501, Page 1162-1163, and Plaintiffs' 
Amended Notice of Mechanic's Lien recorded with the Davis County Recorder on July 18, 
2008 at Entry Number 2380343, Book 4576, Page 436-437, were subordinate to First Utah 
Bank's trust deed recorded on November 9, 2006. First Utah Bank foreclosed on its trust deed 
on April 17,2008 and transferred the property free and clear of Plaintiffs Mechanic's Liens. 
The property at issue is located at 142 North 3475 West, Layton, Utah 84041, and more 
particularly identified as follows: 
ALL OF LOT 116, ROCKWELL ESTATES SUBDIVISION, LAYTON CITY, 
DAVIS COUNTY, UTAH, ACCORDING TO THE OFFICIAL PLAT THEREOF ON 
FILE AND OF RECORD IN THE OFFICE OF THE DAVIS COUNTY RECORDER. 
Parcel ID No. 12-553-0116 
5. Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, §38-1-18, Defendants are hereby awarded 
judgment against Bradley J, Olsen, American Pension Services, Inc., Administrator for Roth 
IRA # 6765 and American Pension Services, Administrator for Roth IRA # 7453, in the 
amount of their reasonable costs in the amount of $j3£Li£? ^ d reasonable attorney's fees in C^~ 
OdtfC the amount of $ VX p^lZ^UTi which costs and fees the Court finds were necessarily expended 
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by Defendants in defending against the claims of Plaintiffs ./This judgment may be augmented 
in the amount of such additional attorney's fees and costs that may be incurred by collecting 
this judgment, as established by affidavit of counsel. 
6. This judgment resolves all claims herein and is entered as the final judgment. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT ENTERED this ^ day of (P^la^rz^ 2009. 
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Miller & Nelson 
This matter came before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 
filed on December 03,2008, and Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March 
10, 2009. The Court heard oral argument on the competing motions and, at the conclusion of 
oral argument, allowed the parties to file supplemental post-argument memoranda. Aiter a 
review of the file in this case, including all supplemental memoranda, the Court finds that there 
are no issues of material fact in dispute that would prevent the entry of summary judgment in 
favor of Defendants on their cross-motion. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth below, 
Defendants' Cross-Motion is GRANTED and Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
is DENIED. 
The detennining issues in the action all relate back ultimately to a construction agreement 
between Matt Hood and Maestro Builders and the construction financing that was obtained in 
connection with that agreement. The submitted memoranda focus on the issue of whether or not 
a mechanic's lien can be expressly subordinated to a subsequently executed lien or mortgage. In 
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particular, the dispute centers on a Guaranty of Completion and Performance that was signed by 
Maestro Builders in favor of First Utah Bank. 
While the recitations of facts in the parties' memoranda indicate that there are some 
lingering factual disputes, those disputes are not material to the Court's ruling. In reciting the 
facts below, the Court makes no findings of fact and will simply rely on the facts as stated in the 
memoranda. Where there is some dispute between the parties, the Court will note the dispute 
and accept, for purposes of this ruling, the facts as asserted by the Plaintiff. 
In approximately August of 2006, Matt Hood, as buyer, and Maestro Builders, LLC 
(hereinafter "Maestro"), as seller and builder, entered into a contract for the construction of a 
residence in Layton, Utah (the "Property"). To finance the construction, Matt Hood borrowed 
money from First Utah Bank (the "Construction Loan"). The Construction Loan was secured by 
a deed of trust on the Property that was recorded on November 9, 2006. There ts some dispute 
between the parties as to when construction activities commenced. However, for purposes of 
this ruling, the Court accepts Plaintiffs assertion that construction activities; began no later than 
November 1, 2006, several days prior to the closing of the Construction Loan. At the closing, 
Maestro was asked to sign a document titled "Guaranty of Completion and Performance" (the 
"Completion Guaranty"). Maestro in feet signed the Completion Guaranty through its 
authorized representative, Mr. Luke Watkins. At the closing, Mr. Watkins did not read the form 
and signed it relying on the closing officer's description using words to the effect of "this just 
tells the bank—or tells us that if the home owner dies that you'll finish the [home] for us, you'll 
guarantee the completion of the home and that you'll finish the home if the home owner is not 
around". Among other things the Completion Guaranty contained the following language: 
Guarantor [Maestro] agrees that the Loan, whether now existing or hereafter created, 
shall be superior to any claim that Guarantor may now have or hereafter acquire against 
Borrower, whether or not Borrower becomes insolvent. Guarantor hereby expressly 
subordinates any claim Guarantor may have against Borrower, upon any account 
whatsoever, to any claim that Lender may now or hereafter have against Borrower. 
After the closing of the Construction Loan, Maestro submitted no less than ten draw 
requests to First Utah Bank, which requests were paid from the proceeds of the Construction 
Loan. Ultimately, however, Matt Hood failed to pay Maestro in full for the work performed. 
The Court notes that the Defendants assert that due to over-billing or wrongful accounting, 
Maestro may actually have been paid in full. For purposes of this ruling, however, the Court 
accepts Plaintiffs' assertion that Maestro was not paid in full for its work. At some point the 
Construction Loan came to be in default and First Utah Bank began foreclosure proceedings 
under its trust deed Maestro recorded a Notice of Lien on the Property on March 31,2008. On 
April 17,2008, First Utah Bank sold the Property in a non-judicial trust deed foreclosure sale to 
Skyline Real Estate. Skyline subsequently sold the Property to Doug and Chantel Chase. In 
connection with the sale, a deed in favor of the Chases was recorded July 18,2008. The Chases* 
purchase was financed by Bank of the West, which recorded two trust deeds on the Property on 
July 18, 2008, in a combined total amount of $323,000.00. Also on July 18, 2008, just prior to 
the recording of the deed to the Chases and the trust deeds in favor of Bank of the West, Maestro 
filed an Amended Notice of Lien against the Property, asserting a lien in the amount of 
$60,614.78. 
Maestro's interest in its mechanic's lien was subsequently assigned to the Plaintiffs 
herein. This action was commenced by the Plaintiffs seeking to foreclose the mechanic's lien. 
Plaintiffs have filed a motion for partial summary judgment asking the Court to rule as a matter 
of law that their lien is prior to the trust deed liens in favor of Bank of the West. The Chases and 
Bank of the West, who are the Defendants in the action, oppose Plaintiffs* motion and have filed 
their own cross-motion for summary judgment asking this Court to rule as a matter of law that 
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the mechanic's lien was extinguished by the First Utah Bank foreclosure sale and is therefore 
unenforceable against the Property. 
In essence, these competing motions ask the Court for a declaration on the relative 
priority of Maestro's mechanic's lien and the construction loan trust deed in ifavor of First Utah 
Bank. The current parties' positions are derivative of those original actors-
Plaintiffs argue that pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§38-1-5 and 38-1-29 the subordination 
provisions of the Completion Guaranty were not enforceable and, therefore, did not operate to 
subordinate Maestro's mechanic's lien to First Utah Bank's trust deed. In essence, Plaintiffs 
argue that to the extent that the Completion Guaranty seeks to alter or waive rights otherwise 
granted to Maestro under Utah's mechanic's lien statute, it is void. Plaintiffs further argue that 
First Utah Bank fraudulently misrepresented to Mr. Watkins the nature of the Completion 
Guaranty document. This fraudulent misrepresentation, according to Plaintiffs, invalidates the 
agreement. 
Defendants argue, on the other hand, that, the Completion Guaranty specifically provides 
that Maestro would subordinate any liens to First Utah Bankfs trust deed used to secure the 
construction financing. Defendants argue that such subordination is not inconsistent with Utah's 
statutory scheme and should be upheld. 
Under Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a court may render summary 
judgment when the evidence shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a maitter of law. Clearly there is no dispute that the 
Completion Guaranty was signed by Maestro. Nor is there any dispute that, if it is enforceable 
as written, the Construction Guaranty provides that Maestro's mechanic's lien would be 
subordinate to the lien of First Utah Bank's construction loan-related deed of trust. 
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The primary legal issue to be decided is whether the subordination of Maestro's mechanic's 
lien was permitted under Utah law as it stood in 2006, thus maldng it junior in priority to First Utah 
Bank's trust deed, As a secondary matter, the Court must decide if the fects asserted by Plaintifis 
would be sufBcient to support a conclusion that the Completion Guaranty should be set aside as 
unenforceable because one party to the contract, in this case Maestro, subsequently asserts that it did 
not realize what the contract really meant and chose not to read die contract based on statements by 
the other party's representative supposedly summarizing the provisions of the contract. 
The first issue requires the Court to interpret §38-1 -29 of the Utah Code. That section reads as 
follows: 
The applicability of the provisions of this chapter, including the waiver of rights or privileges 
granted under this chapter, may not be varied by agreement 
The Completion Guaranty does not, however, indicate that the provisions of Utah's mechanic's lien 
statute would not be "applicable", nor does it indicate that Maestro would be "waiving" any rights 
uncjer that statute. In pertinent part, it simply provides that whatever rights Maestro might have (under 
the mechanic's lien statute or otherwise) would be subordinate to the bank's rights under its 
construction loan. Maestro undisputably received a specific and direct benefit from this subordination 
in die sense that it received payment from the construction loan funds of at least ten draw requests. 
Defendants note that Utah courts have sanctioned the use of lien subordination agreements by 
construction lenders, at least in dictum. In Richards v. Security National Bank, 849 ?2d 606 (Utah 
App. 1993), the Utah Court of Appeals specifically encouraged the use of subordination agreements 
by lenders to protect themselves from identifiable mechanic's lien claims. The Court in Richards 
reasoned that "Commercial lenders can easily examine the property, ask specific questions regarding 
the existence of intervening lienholders, acquire subordination agreements with any lienholders that 
exist, or, in many cases, assume the rights of the earlier lender by assignment" Id. at 612 and n.6 
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While the Richards case was decided prior to the enactment of §38-1-29, the court's reasoning, as it 
relates to the use of subordination agreements, continues to make business sense. In the absence of 
specific language in the statute invalidating such subordination agreements, this Court cannot 
conclude that §384-29 precludes the common business practice of having a specifically identified 
potential mechanic's lien claimant subordinate the priority of its lien to a construction lender from 
whom that very same contractor will then receive payment of its constniction draw requests. 
The second matter of law to be decided is whether, under the facts of this case, the Completion 
Guaranty might be found to be unenforceable due to statements made by the bank's representative at 
the time Maestro's representative was asked to sign the document Even if Plaintiffs' statement of 
facts were taken at face value, it would not support a conclusion that the Completion Guaranty should 
be set aside. It is well-settled law that 
"one party to an agreement does not have a duty to ensure that the other party has a 
complete and accurate understanding of all terms embodied in a written contract. Rather, 
each party has the burden to read and understand the terms of a contract before he or she 
affixes his or her signature to it A party may not sign a contract and thereafter assert 
ignorance or failure to read the contract as a defense." 
Geisdorfv. Doughty, 972 P.2d 67, 73 (Utah 1998). Plaintiffs have not provided any evidence 
that Maestro's representative was coerced, or otherwise forced, to sign the Completion Guaranty 
without taking the time to read it and understand it. Nor is there any evidence that it would have 
been reasonable for Maestro's representative to rely on any statements made by the bank's 
representative about the document before signing it. Accordingly, this Court is in a position to 
summarily dismiss Plaintiffs claim that it was fraudulently induced to sign the Completion 
Guaranty, Maestro's failure to read the Completion Guaranty, under Utah law, is no defense. 
As a result of the foregoing, Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is 
GRANTED. At the time of the trust deed foreclosure, Maestro's mechanic's lien was 
subordinate to First Utah Bank's trust deed and the Property was, therefore, properly conveyed to 
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the Chases free of Maestro's lien. Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED. 
As the prevailing parties, Defendants are entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees and 
costs pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §38-1-18. Defendant's counsel is instructed to prepare, 
circulate and submit an appropriate form of order and to submit an affidavit of fees and costs 
SIGNED and DATED this jP_ day of July, 2009. 
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References to the shaded area are tor Lander's use onty and do not flrnH the applicability of thJs document to any particular loan or Hera 
Any item above containing ***** has been omitted due to text length frnitations. 
Borrower: MATT HOOD (SSN: 52a-4i-8935) 
4648 W. INDIA SPRINGS CIRCLE 
SOUTO JORDAN, UT 84095 
Guarantor: MAESTRO BUILDERS L L C . 
P.O. BOX 814 
KAYSVlLLE, UT 84037 
Lender: First Utah Bank 
Cocwimer Construction Loan Department 
11025 South State Street 
Sandy, ITT 84070 
THIS GUARANTY OF COMPLETION AND PERFORMANCE (•Guaranty") Is made as of October 30, 2006, by MAESTRO BUILDERS LLC. 
(•Guarantor*) to and for the benefit of First Utah Bank ("Lender"). 
THE LOAN. Borrower proposes to borrow from Lender the principal amount of Two Hundred Ninety-nine Thousand A 00/100 DoHars ($299,000.00) 
pursuant to the ternis and conations of the Construction Loan AgreemenL As a condition and inducement to making the Loan, Borrower has 
requested that Guarantor duty execute and deliver this Guaranty guaranteeing the lien-free completion of the construction of the Project and the 
performance of other covenants, which are aH considered by Lender to be material regarding Lender's decision to make the Loan, 
GUARANTY. Guarantor hereby uixxxxfrtionalry and absolutely warrants and guarantees to Lender that (a) construction of the Project shaft be 
commenced and shall be substantia^ completed within the time limits set forth In the Construction Loan Agreement; (b) the Project sbafl be 
constructed and completed in accordance with the Loan Documents and the Plans and Specifications, without substantial deviation therefrom unless 
approved by Lender In writing; (c) except for Lender's security agreements, the Project w* be constructed and completed free and clear of aR Bens 
and encumbrances, ratixfing without limitation all mechanics* Dens, materialmen's liens, and equitable liens; and (d) al costs of constructing the 
Project win be paid when due, and no stop notices shall be served on Lender. 
OBLIGATIONS OF GUARANTOR UPON EVENT OF DEFAULT. Should an Event of Default (as defined in any Construction Loan Agreement) occur or 
if the Project shall not be constructed and completed as provided above, Guarantor shaS: (a) oSigentfy proceed to cure such default and procure 
completion of the Project at Guarantor's sole cost and expense; (b) fufly pay and discharge afl claims for labor perfoimed and material and services 
furnished in <x>nnection with the construction of the Project; and (c) pay such amounts as may be necessary to release and dscharge all claims of stop 
notices, mechanics* liens, materialmen's liens, and equitable liens, if any, that may come hto existence in connection with the construction of the 
ProjecL 
NATURE OF GUARANTY. This Guaranty is an original and independent obligation of Guarantor, separate and distinct from Borrower's obligations to 
Lender under the Loan Documents. The obligations of Guarantor to Lender under this Guaranty are direct and primary, regardless of the validity or 
enforceability of the Loan Documents. This Guaranty k for the benefit of Lender, and is not for the benefit of any thkd party. This Guaranty shall 
continue until (A) the Project has been completed, free and clear of all fims and encumbrances as provided above, and (B) al obligations of 
Guarantor to Lender under this Guaranty have been performed in full. 
GUARANTOR'S AUTHORIZATION TO LENDER. Guarantor authorizes Lender, without notice or demand and without lessening Guarantor's liabifty 
under this Guaranty, from time to time: (a) to make or approve changes to the Ptans and Specifications; (b) to make modifications to the Construction 
Loan Agreement and the other Loan Documents; (c) to make one or more additional secured or unsecured loans to Borrower; (d) to repeatedy after, 
compromise, renew, extend, accelerate, or otherwise change the time for payment or other terms of the Loan or any part of the Loan, including 
increases and decreases of the rate of interest on the Loan; extensions may be repeated and may be for longer than the original loan term; (e) to take 
and hold security for the payment of the Loan or this Guaranty, and exchange, enforce, wahre, and release any such security, with or without the 
substitution of new collateral; (t) to release, substitute, agree not to sue, or deal with any one or more of Borrower's sureties, endorsers, or other 
guarantors on any terms or in any manner Lender may choose; (g) to determine how, when, and what application of payments and credits shall be 
made on the Loan; (h) to apply such security and direct the order or manner of sale thereof, including without finratation, any nonjudicial sale permitted 
by the terms of the controlling security agreement or deed of trust, as Lender k> Lender's discretion may determine; (i) to sell, transfer, assign or grant 
participations in aS or any part of the Loan; and (j) to assign or transfer this Guaranty in whole or in part. 
GUARANTOR'S REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES. Guarantor represents and warrants to Lender that (a) no representations or agreements 
of any kind have been made to Guarantor which would limit or qualify in any way the terms of this Guaranty; (b) this Guaranty is executed at 
Borrower's request and not at the request of Lender to induce Lender to disburse the Loan to Borrower pursuant to the teons of the Loan Documents 
and that Lender would not make and disburse the Loan to Borrower pursuant to the Loan Documents were it not for the execution and delivery of this 
Guaranty; (c) Guarantor has not and will not. without the prior written consent of Lender, sefl, lease, assign, encumber, hypothecate, transfer, or 
otherwise dispose of ail or substantially aB of Guarantor's assets, or any interest therein; (d) neither the execution nor the delivery of this Guaranty nor 
compliance with the terms hereof wiU conflict with or result in the breach of any law or statute, wBi constitute a breach or default under any agreement 
or instrument to which Guarantor may be a party, or wW result in ti)e creation or imposition of any charge or lien upon any property or assets of 
Guarantor; (e) Lender has made no representation to Guarantor as to fre creditworthiness of Borrower; (f) the most recent financial statements of 
Guarantor heretofore delivered to Lender are true and correct in all material respects and fairly present the financial condition of Guarantor as of the 
respective dates thereof, and no material adverse change has occurred In the financial condition of Guarantor since the date of the most recent 
financial statements; and (g) Guarantor has established adequate means of obtaining from Borrower on a continuing basis information regarding 
Borrower's financial condition Guarantor agrees to keep adequately informed from such means of any facts, events, or circumstances which might in 
any way affect Guarantor's risks under this Guaranty, and Guarantor further agrees that, absent a request for information, Lender shall have no 
obligation to disclose to Guarantor any information or documents acquired by Lender in the course of Its relationship with Borrower. 
GUARANTOR'S WAIVERS. Except as prohibited by applicable law. Guarantor waives any right to require Lender: (A) to make any presentment, JjJ 
protest, demand, or notice of any kind, including notice of any nonpayment of the Loan or of any nonpayment related to any security agreement, or v>l 
notice of any action or nonaction on the part of Borrower, Lender, any surety, endorser, or other guarantor in connection with the Loan or ki connection 
with the creation of new or additional loans or obligations; (B) to resort for payment or to proceed dkectiy or at once agahst any person, Including 
Borrower or «ny other guarantor, (C) to proceed directly against or exhaust any collateral hekJ by Lender from Borrower, any other guarantor, or any 
other person (D) to give notice of the terms, time, and place of any public or private sale of personal property security held by Lender from Borrower 
or to comply with any other applicable provisfons of the Uniform Comrnercial Cede; (E) to pursue any otfwr remedy within Lender's power, or <f> to 
commit any act or omission of any kind, or at any time, with respect to any matter whatsoever. 
Guarantor also waives and agrees not to assert or take advantage of (A) any right (including-8ie right, if any, under Utah's one-action rule as set forth L L 
in Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section 78-37-1) to require Lender to proceed against or exhaust any security held by Lender at any time or to pursue 
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any other remedy in Lender's power before proceeding against Guarantor; (B) the release or surrender of any security held for the payments of the 
Loan indebtedness; or (C) any defense based upon an election of remedies (including, if available, an election of remedies to proceed by non-judicial 
foreclosure) by Lender which destroys or otherwise impairs the subrogation rights of Guarantor or the right of Guarantor to proceed against Borrower 
for reimbursement, or both. 
Guarantor further waives and agrees not to assert or claim at any time any deductions to the amount guaranteed under this Guaranty for any claim of 
setoff, counterclaim, counter demand, recoupment, or similar right, whether such claim, demand, or right may be asserted by the Borrower, the 
Guarantor, or both. 
GUARANTOR'S UNDERSTANDING WITH RESPECT TO WAIVERS. Guarantor warrants and agrees that each of the waivers set forth above is made 
with Guarantor's full knowledge of Guarantor's significance and consequences and that, under the circumstances, the waivers are reasonable and not 
contrary to public policy or law. If any such waiver is determined to be contrary to any applicable law or public policy, such waiver shall be effective 
only to the extent permitted by law. 
RIGHT OF SETOFF. To the extent permitted by applicable law, Lender reserves a right of setoff in all Guarantor's accounts with Lender (whether 
checking, savings, or some other account). This includes aB accounts Guarantor holds jointly with someone else and all accounts Guarantor may open 
in the future. However, this does not include any IRA or Keogh accounts, or any trust accounts for which setoff would be prohibited by law. Guarantor 
authorizes Lender, to the extent permitted by applicable law, to hold these funds if there is a default, and Lender may apply the funds in these accounts 
to pay what Guarantor owes under the terms of this Guaranty. 
RIGHTS AND REMEDIES. If Guarantor shall fail to perform promptly as provided in this Guaranty, Lender shalhhave the following rights and remedies: 
Perform Work. Lender, at its option, but without any obligation to do so, may proceed to perform on behalf o< Guarantor any and all work on the 
Project and to pay any costs incurred in connection with the work. Guarantor, upon Lender's demand, shall promptly pay to Lender all such sums 
expended together with interest thereon at the interest rate set forth in ithe Note. 
Cure Defaults. Lender, at its option, but without any obligation to do so, may cure any defaults, including without limitation, paying any unpaid 
bills and liens, including without limitation those for construction, labor, and materials. Guarantor, upon Lender's demand, shall promptly pay to 
Lender all such sums expended together with interest thereon at the interest rate set forth in the Note. 
Specific Performance. From time to time and without first requiring performance on the part of Bonower and without being required to exhaust 
any security held by Lender for the Loan, to require Guarantor specifically to perform Guarantor's obligations under this Guaranty, by action at law 
or in equity or both, and further, to collect in any such action, compensation for all loss, cost, damage, injury and expense sustained or incurred by 
Lender as a direct or indirect consequence of Borrower's or Guarantor's failure to perform, with interest thereon at the interest rate set forth in the 
Note. 
Other Rights and Remedies. In addition, Lender shall have and may exercise any or all of the rights and remedies it may have available at law, 
in equity, or otherwise. 
SUBORDINATION OF BORROWER'S DEBTS TO GUARANTOR. Guarantor agrees that the Loan, whether now existing or hereafter created, shall be 
superior to any claim that Guarantor may now have or hereafter acquire against Borrower, whether or not Borrower becomes insolvenL Guarantor 
hereby expressly subordinates any claim Guarantor may have against Borrower, upon any account whatsoever, to any claim that Lender may now or 
hereafter have against Borrower. In the event of insolvency and consequent liquidation of the assets of Borrower, through bankruptcy, by an 
assignment for the benefit of creditors, by voluntary liquidation, or otherwise, the assets of Borrower applicable to the payment of the claims of both 
Lender and Guarantor shall be paid to Lender and shall be first applied by Lender to the Loan. Guarantor does hereby assign to Lender all claims 
which it may have or acquire against Borrower or against any assignee or trustee in bankruptcy of Borrower; provided however, that such assignment 
shall be effective only for the purpose of assuring to Lender full payment in legal tender of the Loaa If Lender so requests, any notes or credit 
agreements now or hereafter evidencing any debts or obligations of Borrower to Guarantor shall be marked with a legend that the same are subject to 
this Guaranty and shall be delivered to Lender. Guarantor agrees, and Lender is hereby authorized, in the name of Guarantor, from time to time to file 
financing statements and continuation statements and to execute documents and to take such other actions as Lender deems necessary or appropriate 
to perfect, preserve and enforce its rights under this Guaranty. 
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS. The following miscellaneous provisions are a part of this Guaranty: 
Amendments. This Guaranty, together with any Related Documents, constitutes the entire understanding and agreement of the parties as to the 
matters set forth in this Guaranty. No alteration of or amendment to this Guaranty shall be effective unless given in writing and signed by the party 
or parties sought to be charged or bound by the alteration or amendmemL 
Attorneys' Fees; Expenses. Guarantor agrees to pay upon demand all of Lender's costs and expenses, including Lender's reasonable attorneys' 
fees and Lender's legal expenses, incurred *m connection with the enforcement of this Guaranty. Lender may hire or pay someone else to help 
enforce this Guaranty, and Guarantor shall pay the costs and expenses of such enforcement Costs and expenses Include Lender's reasonable 
attorneys' fees and legal expenses whether or not Lender's salaried employee and whether or not there is a lawsuit, including reasonable 
attorneys' fees and legal expenses for bankruptcy proceedings (including efforts to modify or vacate any automatic stay or injunction), appeals, 
and any anticipated post-judgment collection services. Guarantor also shall pay all court costs and such additional fees as may be directed by the 
court 
Caption Headings. Caption headings in this Guaranty are for convenience purposes only and are not to be used to interpret or define the 
provisions of this Guaranty. 
Governing Law. This Guaranty will be governed by federal law applicable to Lender and, .to the extent not preempted by federal law, the 
laws of the State of Utah without regard to Us conflicts of law provisions. This Guaranty has been accepted by Lender in the State of 
Utah. 
No Waiver by Lender. Lender shall not be deemed to have waived any rights under this Guaranty unless such waiver is given in writing and 
signed by Lender. No delay or omission on the part of Lender in exercising any right shall operate as a waiver of such right or any other right A 
waiver by Lender of a provision of this Guaranty shall not prejudice or constitute a waiver of Lender's right otherwise to demand strict compliance 
with that provision or any other provision of this Guaranty. No prior waiver by Lender, nor any course of dealing between Lender and Guarantor, 
shall constitute a waiver of any of Lender's rights or of any of f3uarantor's obligations as Ao any future transactions. Whenever the consent of 
Lender is required under this Guaranty, the granting of such consent by Lender in any instance shall not constitute continuing consent to 
subsequent instances where such consent is required and in all cases such consent may be granted or withheld in Ihe sole discretion of Lender. 
Notices. Unless otherwise provided by applicable law, any notice required to be given under this Guaranty CM required by law shall be given in 
writing, and shall be effective when actually delivered in accordance with the law or with this Guaranty, when actually received by telefacsimile 
(unless otherwise required by law), when deposited with a nationally recognized overnight courier, or, if mailed, when deposited in the United 
States mail, as first class, certified or registered ma3 postage prepaid, cfirected to the addresses shown near trie beginning of this Guaranty. .Any 
party may change its address for notices under this. Guaranty by-giving formahwritleii notice to the other parties -specifying that the purpose of the 
GUAR r r OF COMPLETION AND PERf STANCE 
Loan No: 90-0000-9663 (Cont inued) Page 3 
notice is to change the party's address. For notice purposes, Guarantor agrees to keep Lender informed at a!I times of Guarantor's current 
address. Unless otherwise provided by applicable law, if there is more than one Guarantor, any notice given by Lender to any Guarantor is 
deemed to be notice given to all Guarantors. 
Interpretation. In all cases where theW is more than one Guarantor, then all words used in this Guaranty in the singular shall be deemed to have 
been used in the plural where the context and construction so require; and where there is more than one Guarantor named in this Guaranty or 
when this Guaranty is executed by more than one , the words "Guarantor" shall mean all and any one or more of them. Reference to the phrase 
"Guarantor" includes the heirs, successors, assigns, and transferees of each of them. 
Severability. If a court of competent jurisdiction finds any provision of this Guaranty to be illegal, invalid, or unenforceable as to any 
circumstance, that finding shall not maKe the offending provision illegal, invalid, or unenforceable as to any other circumstance. If feasible, the 
offending provision shall be considered modified so that H becomes legal, valid and enforceable. If the offending provision cannot be so modified, 
it shall be considered deleted from this Guaranty. Unless otherwise required by law, the illegality, invalidity, or unenforceability of any provision ot 
this Guaranty shall not affect the legality, validity or enforceability of any other provision of this Guaranty. 
Successors and Assigns. Subject to any limitations stated in this Guaranty on transfer of Guarantor's interest, this Guaranty shall be binding 
upon and inure to the benefit of the parties, their successors and assigns. If ownership of the Collateral becomes vested in a person other than 
Guarantor, Lender, without notice to Guarantor, may deal with Guarantor's successors with reference to this Guaranty and the Loan by way of 
forbearance or extension without releasing Guarantor from the obligations of this Guaranty or liability under the Loan. 
DEFINITIONS. The following capitalized words and terms shall have the following meanings when used in this Guaranty. Unless specifically stated to 
the contrary, all references to dollar amoints shall mean amounts in lawful money of the United States of America. Words and terms used in the 
singular shall include the plural, and the plural shall include the singular, as the context may require. Words and terms not otherwise defined in this 
Guaranty shall have the meanings attributed to such terms in the Uniform Commercial Code: 
Borrower. The word "Borrower* means WATT HOOD and includes all co-signers and co-makers signing the Note and all their successors and 
assigns. 
Collateral. The word "Collateral" means all of Guarantor's right, title and interest in and to all the Collateral as described in the Collateral 
Description section of this Guaranty. 
Guarantor. The word "Guarantor me^ns everyone signing this Guaranty, including without limitation MAESTRO BUILDERS L.L.C., and in each 
case, any signer's successors and assigns. 
Guaranty. The word "Guaranty' means the guaranty from guarantor, endorser, surety, or accommodation party to Lender, including without 
limitation a guaranty of all or part of th« Note. 
Lender. The word "Lender" means First Utah Bank, its successors and assigns. 
Loan. The word "Loan" means the loan made to Borrower under the Construction Loan Agreement and the Loan Documents as described below. 
Note. The word "Note" means the Nota executed by MATT HOOD in the principal amount of $299,000.00 dated October 30, 2006, together with 
all renewals of, extensions of, modifications of, refinancings of, consolidations of, and substitutions for the note or credit agreemenL 
Plans and Specifications. The words "Plans and Specifications" mean the plans and specifications for the Project which have been submitted to 
and initialed by Lender, together with such changes and additions as may be approved by Lender in writing. 
ProjecL The word "Project" means the construction, renovation, or other work on the improvements as set forth in the Plans and Specifications. 
Related Documents. The words "Belated Documents" mean all promissory notes, credit agreements, loan agreements, environmental 
agreements, guaranties, security agreements, mortgages, deeds of trust, security deeds, collateral mortgages, and all other instruments, 
agreements and documents, whether now or hereafter existing, executed in connection with the Loan. 
EACH UNDERSIGNED GUARANTOR ACKNOWLEDGES HAVING READ ALL THE PROVISIONS OF THIS GUARANTY AND AGREES TO ITS 
TERMS. IN ADDfTION, EACH GUARANTOR UNDERSTANDS THAT THIS GUARANTY IS EFFECTIVE UPON GUARANTOR'S EXECUTION AND 
DEUVERY OF THIS GUARANTY TO LENDER. NO FORMAL ACCEPTANCE BY LENDER IS NECESSARY TO MAKE THIS GUARANTY 
EFFECTIVE. THIS GUARANTY IS DATED OCTOBER 30, 2006. 
GUARANTOR: 
D^RS L L C . >-
Srantor for MAESTRO BUILDERS ULC. 
LENDER: 
FIRST UTAH BANK 
Melissa Park, ConstroctirfriHJMlA^ icer 
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1) As used in this section: 
a) "Check" means a payment instrument on a depository institution including: 
i) a check; 
ii) a draft; 
iii) an order; or 
iv) other instrument. 
b) "Depository institution" is as defined in Section 7-1-103. 
c) "Lien claimant" means a person that claims a lien under this chapter. 
d) "Receives payment" means, in the case of a restrictive endorsement, a payee has endorsed a check and the check 
resented to and paid by the depository institution on which it is drawn. 
2) Notwithstanding Section 38-1-29, a written consent given by a lien claimant that waives or limits the lien 
mant's lien rights is enforceable only if the lien claimant: 
a) (i) executes a waiver and release that is signed by the lien claimant or the lien claimant's authorized agent; or 
ii) for a restrictive endorsement on a check, includes a restrictive endorsement on a check that is: 
A) signed by the lien claimant or the lien claimant's authorized agent; and 
B) in substantially the same form set forth in Subsection (4)(d); and 
b) receives payment of the amount identified in the waiver and release or check that includes the restrictive 
3rsement: 
i) including payment by a joint payee check; and 
ii) for a progress payment, only to the extent of the payment. 
3) (a) Notwithstanding the language of a waiver and release described in Subsection (2), Subsection (3)(b) applies 
i) the payment given in exchange for any waiver and release of lien is made by check; and 
ii) the check fails to clear the depository institution on which it is drawn for any reason. 
b) If the conditions of Subsection (3)(a) are met: 
L) the waiver and release described in Subsection (3)(a) is null, void, and of no legal effect; and 
ii) the following will not be affected by the lien claimant's execution of the waiver and release: 
A) any lien; 
B) any lien right; 
Z) any bond right; 
D) any contract right; or 
E) any other right to recover payment afforded to the lien claimant in law or equity. 
V) (a) A waiver and release given by a lien claimant meets the requirements of this section if it is in substantially 
brm provided in this Subsection (4) for the circumstance provided in this Subsection (4). 
}) A waiver and release may be in substantially the following form if the lien claimant is required to execute a 
rer and release in exchange for or to induce the payment of a progress billing: 
"UTAH CONDITIONAL WAIVER AND RELEASE UPON PROGRESS PAYMENT 
erty Name: 
erty Location: 
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Jndersigned's Customer: 
nvoice/Payment Application Number: 
^yment Amount: 
}ayment Period: 
To the extent provided below, this document becomes effective to release and the undersigned is considered to 
vaive any notice of lien or right under Utah Code Ann., Title 38, Chapter 1, Mechanics' Liens, or any bond right under 
Jtah Code Ann., Title 14, Contractors' Bonds, or Section 63G-6-505 related to payment rights the undersigned has on 
he above described Property once: 
(1) the undersigned endorses a check in the above referenced Payment Amount payable to the undersigned; and 
(2) the check is paid by the depository institution on which it is drawn. 
This waiver and release applies to a progress payment for the work, materials, equipment, or a combination of work, 
naterials, and equipment furnished by the undersigned to the Property or to the Undersigned's Customer which are the 
ubject of the Invoice or Payment Application, but only to the extent of the Payment Amount. This waiver and release 
loes not apply to any retention withheld; any items, modifications, or changes pending approval; disputed items and 
:laims; or items furnished or invoiced after the Payment Period. 
The undersigned warrants that the undersigned either has already paid or will use the money the undersigned 
eceives from this progress payment promptly to pay in full all the undersigned's laborers, subcontractors, materialmen, 
ind suppliers for all work, materials, equipment, or combination of work, materials, and equipment that are the subject 





(c) A waiver and release may be in substantially the following form if the lien claimant is required to execute a 
vaiver and release in exchange for or to induce the payment of a final billing: 




nvoice/Payment Application Number: 
*ayment Amount: 
To the extent provided below, this document becomes effective to release and the undersigned is considered to 
vaive any notice of lien or right under Utah Code Ann., Title 38, Chapter 1, Mechanics' Liens, or any bond right under 
Jtah Code Ann., Title 14, Contractors' Bonds, or Section 63G-6-505 related to payment rights the undersigned has on 
he above described Property once: 
(1) the undersigned endorses a check in the above referenced Payment Amount payable to the undersigned; and 
(2) the check is paid by the depository institution on which it is drawn. 
This waiver and release applies to the final payment for the work, materials, equipment, or combination of work, 
materials, and equipment furnished by the undersigned to the Property or to the Undersigned's Customer. 
The undersigned warrants that the undersigned either has already paid or will use the money the undersigned 
eceives from the final payment promptly to pay in full all the undersigned's laborers, subcontractors, materialmen, and 
uppliers for all work, materials, equipment, or combination of work, materials, and equipment that are the subject of 





(d) A restrictive endorsement placed on a check to effectuate a waiver and release described in this Subsection (4) 
neets the requirements of this section if it is in substantially the following form: 
"This check is a progress/ final payment for property described on this check sufficient for identification. 
lorsement of this check is an acknowledgment by the endorser that the waiver and release to which the payment 
lies is effective to the extent provided in Utah Code Ann. Subsection 38-l-39(4)(b) or (c) respectively." 
e^) (i) If using a restrictive endorsement under Subsection (4)(d), the person preparing the check shall indicate 
t^her the check is for a progress payment or a final payment by circling the word "progress" if the check is for a 
gress payment, or the word "final" if the check is for a final payment. 
'ii) If a restrictive endorsement does not indicate whether the check is for a progress payment or a final payment, it 
onsidered to be for a progress payment. 
[5) (a) If the conditions of Subsection (5)(b) are met, this section does not affect the enforcement of: 
T) an accord and satisfaction regarding a bona fide dispute; or 
'ii) an agreement made in settlement of an action pending in any court or arbitration. 
V) Pursuant to Subsection (5)(a), this section does not affect enforcement of an accord and satisfaction or settlement 
bribed in Subsection (5)(a) if the accord and satisfaction or settlement: 
1) is in a writing signed by the lien claimant; and 
'ii) specifically references the lien rights waived or impaired. 
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